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Reducing Barriers to Trade in Nontraded Goods and Services
by Fred Thompson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Given the magnitude of bilateral trade between Canada and the United
States, it might seem that the nontraded goods sectors of the two
countries are of trivial significance. In fact, they're quite large. It's been
estimated that well over half of the goods and services that are produced
in both Canada and the United States are neither traded abroad nor subject to foreign competition.
Clearly, there are many goods and services that would not be traded
under any circumstances. Bilateral trade is nearly impossible, for example, where the location of the service supplier is an important component
of the consumer's preference functions-dog groomers, for example.
Even if dog groomers in Halifax charged half the price that they charge
in Manhattan, the Manhattan matrons would not take their poodles to
Halifax. In other instances, regional tastes or needs are highly specialized, and local suppliers are simply best equipped to satisfy those wants.
However, these natural barriers to trade are not at issue here. If they're a
problem for someone, they're a problem for the managers, the entrepreneurs, engineers and product developers, who figure out how to overcome them-and in some cases create them.
As policy analysts, we're concerned with barriers to trade that result
from the actions (or inactions) of government which overcome (or in
some cases create) artificial barriers to trade. From this perspective, two
nontraded good sectors stand out with great clarity. These are what I
term the regulated goods and services sector, and the public sector.
These two sectors constitute a sizable proportion of the economies of
both Canada and the United States.
Several years ago, W. T. Stanbury, of the University of British Columbia, and I estimated that 29% of Canada's gross domestic product
(GDP) and 26% of the GDP of the United States were subject to direct
government controls on entry.1 Clearly, where government intervenes in
the economy to restrict the contestability of markets, whether those restrictions are intended to exclude foreign competitors or not, they have
* Associate Professor, Graduate Program in Public Policy, Columbia University. Professor
Thompson has currently been conducting a series of conferences which have considered the implications of sectoral integration for particular industries.
1 Stanbury & Thompson, The Scope and Coverage of Regulation in Canada and the United
States, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION: GROWTH, SCOPE, PRocEss (Stanbury ed. 1980).
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that effect. Technological change and deregulation have eroded many of
these restrictions in the United States, but various levels of government
continue to subject a variety of industries to direct regulation. Consequently, even in the United States, this nontraded sector remains large,
perhaps 18-20% of GDP.
There are several different ways we could measure the public sector,
but for our purposes the best measure of the magnitude or scope of the
public sector is "exhaustive expenditure," which accounts for the consumption of resources used to provide goods and services that are collectively purchased, including services that governments perform for
themselves. Here, too, governments tend to promote monopoly, to
award highly restricted franchises, and to restrict the contestability of
markets. Again, restrictions on domestic markets necessarily precludes
the possibility of international exchange. In terms of exhaustive expenditures, the public sectors of Canada and the United States represent approximately 18% and 16%, respectively, of GDP.'
There is also a third sector, where the situation is reversed. Here,
the absence of framework regulation that would provide a satisfactory
basis for domestic markets has inhibited the exploitation of potentially
large bilateral markets. In this sector, if government has sinned, the sin
has been one of omission, rather than of commission.
To say that these sectors are large is not to say they are important to
discussions of bilateral trade. Why, after all, should we focus our attention on these sectors rather than on the currently traded goods and services sectors? To answer this question, it's necessary to say something
about the benefits of trade. That will determine whether or not these
sectors are, in fact, relevant to our discussion. If you believe that the
principal benefits from reducing trade barriers lie in export promotion,
then my focus is not merely heretical, but entirely absurd. I really have
nothing to say to people who share these beliefs. If the mercantilist fallacy is not understood by now, nothing I can say will have much effect.
My comments are, rather, directed primarily to those people who
identify the benefits of trade exclusively in terms of the static gains from
the exploitation of comparative advantage. I do not want to dispute the
logic of comparative advantage. Undoubtedly, reducing trade barriers
between Canada and the United States would result in a more efficient
reallocation of resources between the two countries.3 Moreover, I am
persuaded by the evidence that a U.S.-Canada free-trade area would produce benefits from trade creation well in excess of the costs of trade
diversion.
This is particularly evident where Canada is concerned. According
to Wonnacott:
2 Shariff, How Big is Government?, 8 Soc. POL'Y 22 (1978); See ECONOMIC REPORT OF TlE
PRESIDENT (Gov't. Printing Office 1985).
3 See generally THOMPSON & JONES, REGULATORY POLICY AND PRACTICES (1982).
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All the clues available suggest that, in considering strictly bilateral
free-trade partners from solely an economic point of view, the U.S.
would unambiguously be [Canada's] first choice. A Free Trade Area

with the United States is likely to maximize the gains from trade creation, minimize any losses from trade diversion, and provide Canada
with at least as much benefit from a partner's diversion as any alternative bilateral arrangement. In fact, Canada's situation is unique in that
are achievable from
most of the gains from full multilateral free-trade
4
bilateral free-trade with a single partner.
What is unsatisfactory about with this argument is, first, that it has
limited relevance to the United States and, second, that events have deprived it of much of the content it once had. When the Tokyo Round
tariff reductions are fully implemented in June of 1987, 65% of U.S. exports to Canada will enter duty free and another 26% will enter at rates
of 5% or less. Eighty percent of Canadian exports to the U.S. will enter
duty free and up to 95% will be subject to tariffs of 5% or less. The
increasing irrelevance of tariff barriers to trade between our two countries is reflected in the apparent tendency of trade officials to worry more
about issues like customs administration, subsidies, and discriminatory
tax treatment than they do about tariffs.
Rather than denying the claim that static efficiency gains will result
from a fuller exploitation of comparative advantage, I want to make an
additional claim: that the most important gains from freer trade result
from dynamic efficiencies produced by more competitive markets. The
notion that the absence of competition in an industry leads to dynamic or
technical inefficiency is very old one as propositions in economics go. As
far back as Adam Smith, economists have proposed that we must promote competition.
There are several plausible justifications for this prescription. The
most plausible has always seemed to be the one which started with the
assumption that the social functions of the market work best where firms
are faced with a hostile, threatening environment-in which they must
deliver, in terms of product and price, in order to survive. Such an environment is supposed to ensure allocative efficiency and, perhaps of even
greater importance, motivate organizational managers to strive for technical efficiency and to develop new products and markets. Today, more
than half of the new jobs created in the United States are to make new
products, new brands, or new services.
Regrettably, most managers in any organization would prefer a less
threatening environment in which prices are always high enough to earn
a fair profit, and market shares are stable. For many-perhaps mostorganizations, the search for such a safe haven is a vain one, realizable
only through enterprise (for example, the identification of an unexploited
4 Wonnaeott, PresidentialAddress Controlling Trade and Foreign Investment in the Canadian
Economy, Some Proposals, 15 CAN. J. ECON. 567 (1982).
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product/market niche) or under the police powers of the state. However,
where economies of scale in production, marketing or finance are substantial enough relative to the size of the market, firms can find shelter
and gain the benefits of the quiet life, insulated from the pressures arising
from changes in consumer taste or technological changes.
In the United States and to a lesser extent in Canada, economists
tend to believe that antitrust (or anticombine) regulation is the most appropriate means of promoting competition. Antitrust regulation prohibits business practices that may result in the monopolization, or
cartelization, of an industry. Its basic aim is to make it harder to collude
than to compete.
But antitrust policy is by no means costless. In the first place, antitrust regulation necessarily imposes upon society at large extensive monitoring, enforcement, and litigation costs. In addition to that, it's clear
that it may also result in the sacrifice of some internal economies of scope
and scale, both at the organizational and the plant level. Because of the
size of the Canadian market, these costs have always been more apparent
to Canadian economists than their American counterparts. But even in
the United States, the cost of antitrust is beginning to be recognized. Indeed, many of those who advocate the elaboration of an American industrial strategy do so because they recognize the need for industrial
rationalization in order to meet foreign challenges. But, at the same
time, they understand the enforcement of antitrust means that private
actions, which could bring about such a rationalization, are frequently
illegal, such as horizontal mergers.5
What is frequently ignored in the United States, though rarely in
Canada, is that many of the dynamic benefits that accrue from a vigorous
antitrust policy can be secured via free trade. Furthermore, these benefits can be obtained without incurring substantial administrative costs or,
if the market is sufficiently broadened, the sacrifice of significant economies of scale. Indeed, our Canadian colleagues frequently remind us that
both the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Canadian Anticombines Act
were in large part necessitated by the emergence of powerful cartels that
grew up behind the substantial tariff barriers erected around both Canada and the United States in the second half of the 19th Century.
My point therefore is quite simple. The principal benefit from freer
trade accrues to the importing nation. The benefit does not lie wholly, or
even primarily, in the consequent increase of quantity or diversity of
goods and services made available to the importing nation's consumers
via fuller exploitation of comparative advantage. Rather, it results from
forcing organizations in the importing nation to be more efficient, more
innovative and more responsive to consumer preference and taste. It also
results from forcing organizations that fail to so respond out of business,
5 See THUROW, THE ZERO SUM SocIETY (1979).
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thereby liberating resources for better, higher uses. As H. E. English
observed:
If Canadian exports of manufacturers are to become relatively
more important...the efficiency of these sectors [must] improve relative
to the resource sectors, a change that in part [will] depend upon Canada's willingness and ability to expose its manufacturers to internasuppliers to the same
tional markets and to competition from foreign
6
degree as the resource based industries are.
Of course, this logic applies as well to the United States and, afortiori, to the nontraded goods and services sectors in both Canada and the
United States. Let us consider each of these sectors using this logic.

II. THE REGULATED

SECTOR

This sector is no longer entirely ignored in discussions of international trade policy. Free-traders tend to reserve their harshest criticism
for regulatory restrictions that are blatantly protectionist in intent. But
there is also a growing appreciation of the degree to which apparently
neutral regulations can be made to serve the protectionist end.
For example, consider the Consumer Product Safety Act-which
sounds fairly neutral. Since Americans are no better at making safe
products than anyone else is, it might be hard to see how excluding hazardous products would particularly advantage American firms or discriminate against foreign competitors. In fact, there's no reason why it
should. But product safety standards can take a variety of forms.
Shortly after it was established, the Consumer Product Safety Council asked the Bicycle Trade Association to help them devise standards for
bicycles. After all, bicycles are-after automobiles-the most hazardous
product sold in the United States and the Consumer Product Safety
Commission doesn't have any authority over automobiles. And, it is perfectly understandable that it should have asked the industry for this kind
of help, since the bicycle industry had certain expertise which the Commission clearly lacked. At the same time, we ought not to be too surprised that the design standards that the industry proposed would have
excluded from U.S. markets most of the bikes made outside of the United
States and all of the bikes made in the Far East. For a free-trader this
story has a happy ending to it. The standards proposed by the industry
were not promulgated. Of course, the United States no longer has a bicycle industry.
Just to show you I'm not partial, let me also offer a Canadian example. Albert Liston of the Health Protection Branch (HPB) boasts of how
he helped organize Canadian producers of analgesics into a cartel and
6 English, "NationalPolicy" and Canadian Trade, INTr'L PMEsPEcvEs 3 (Mar./Apr. 1984).
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used the regulatory authority of the HPB to manage it.7 In this case, the
quid pro quo for the Health Protection Branch was that the Canadian
drug industry agreed to support the HPB's regulatory program. I would
suggest to you that, owing to the greater discretion of Canadian regulatory authorities, and to the fact that regulations adopted in Canada are
developed in close consultation with the affected industry, it's likely that
regulation serves protectionist ends in Canada more frequently than it
does in the United States.
But these kinds of protectionist practices are only the tip of the regulatory iceberg. Almost all regulation has the effect of excluding foreign
competitors from domestic markets. This is necessarily the case with
respect to what is called direct, or industry-specific, regulation which restricts one or more of the following variables: price, rate of return, entry,
exit, the rate of output and/or the conditions of service. Until very recently, direct regulation was applied to much the same group of industries in the United States as in Canada. Today, Canadian constraints on
the contestability of markets are more extensive.8 This is unambiguously
the case insofar as airlines, buses, trucking, natural gas and oil production, financial and business services are concerned-it's probably the case
with respect to banking, broadcasting and insurance.
These constraints restrict bilateral trade, even when they are applied
in a completely nondiscriminatory way. For example, following trucking
deregulation in the United States, Canadian trucking firms substantially
expanded their market share in the U.S., particularly with respect to
transborder freight operations. What this clearly shows is that prior to
trucking deregulation these firms were excluded by Interstate Commerce
Commission restrictions on market entry. And U.S. firms continue to be
excluded by direct regulation from most Canadian markets. Yet there is
clearly no discrimination against U.S. truckers; in most provinces, Canadian truckers can't get new or expanded operating rights either.
Social regulation frequently restricts competition also. Social regulation focuses on the specification of methods of production, attributes of
products or services, conditions of sale or employment, disclosure of information and permissible discharge rates of undesirable products. In
general, social regulation is directed at a broad cross-section of industries- although some are more affected than others. The major types of
social regulation include environmental protection regulation, health and
safety regulation, land use and building codes, consumer protection regulation, "fairness regulation" and what has been called elsewhere "nation
building" regulation 9 (e.g., content requirements in broadcasting) which
in the context of this discussion is largely peculiar to Canada.
7 Liston, The Role of Administrative Discretion, (paper presented at conference on The Regulatory Process:Assessing its Effectiveness and Reform) (SUNY Buffalo, Mar. 8-9 1984).
8 See STANBURY & THOMPSON, REGULATORY REFORM IN CANADA (1982).
9 ECON. COUNCIL OF CANADA, RESPONSIBLE REGULATION (1979) (available from Minister of
Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa).
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The aims of social regulation, with the possible exception of nation
building regulation, are inherently trade neutral. In some cases they
might even promote trade. Differential regulatory regimes constitute a
significant source of comparative advantage. For example, emission controls, the kind of controls that have been imposed by the Clean Air Act
and Clean Water Act in the United States, are very important to most
manufacturing industries, particularly the traditional heavy industries.
They are practically irrelevant to services. In the United States, their
existence constitutes a source of international comparative advantage for
the latter. To the extent that a country's regulations, therefore, have a
differential impact across sectors, their effects ought to be to stimulate
rather than suppress trade.
Trade suppression does not result from the aims of social regulation,
but from its administration. Careful observation informs us that one of
the typical consequences of command and control type regulation is that
it does, in fact, induce substantial dynamic inefficiencies. Losses occur as
a result of institutional changes that retard the processes of creative destruction through which capitalist economies grow, adapt and expand.
Again, I would stress there's nothing inherent to this type of regulation
that causes it to result in dynamic efficiency losses. It is even possible
that controls could be designed that would accelerate the rate at which
economies transform themselves. But in practice, there is a very real
tendency for regulatory authorities to favor what "is" at the expense of
what "might be" (e.g., favoring existing plants and firms at the expense
of new or potential competitors). In both Canada and the United States,
this propensity often takes the form of a double standard: one for existing
firms and a higher one for new firms. This has the effect of subjecting
change in growth to a substantial implicit tariff behind which existing,
often inefficient, firms are sheltered.1 0 Again, this propensity is apparently carried further in Canada than it is in the United States. Under the
Canadian case-by-case approach to social regulation, the less profitable
the firm the less that may be required of it.
The bottom line is that free-traders ought to have an interest in promoting deregulation and regulatory reform in order to increase the contestability of markets generally, not merely with respect to restrictions
that are explicitly discriminatory. At the same time, regulatory reformers should recognize that comprehensive bilateral free-trade could prove
to be a very effective wedge to drive further deregulation. It is inherently
easier to harmonize commercial policies on the basis of reliance on free
markets than on the basis of command and control type regulation.
Insofar as direct regulation is concerned, Canada is the laggard. I
would remind you of the Economic Council of Canada's (ECC) propos10

See generally CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION (1983).
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als on this issue," which would have considerably increased entry were
they implemented and adopted:
1. Railroads
-Increase the speed and freedom of the CTC to respond to grievances under the "captive shipper" provisions of the Railway Act.
-Disallow intermodal acquisitions where the efficiency gains do
not offset the harmful effects on competition.
-Review the exemptions from the Combines Investigation Act.
2. Trucking
-Remove all regulatory restrictions on the operating freedom of
existing for-hire carriers.
-Abolish all rate-filing or tariff-setting regulations.
-Administer all licensing of interprovincial carriers through the
Canadian Conference of Motor Transport Administrators rather than
the provinces.
-Permit entry based only on carriers meeting minimum technical
requirements on a first-come, first-served basis (note, the provinces
could still control entry).
3. Taxicabs
-Gear price and entry controls toward a very gradual reduction
in the market value of taxicab licenses (including special licenses to
serve airports).
-License cabs over an entire urban area.
-Permit all licensed cabs to serve airports when existing exclusive contracts expire.
4. Airlines
-Allow new entry based on a "one-way swinging gate" approach
(i.e., the regionals could freely enter the national carriers' markets, but
not vice-versa for several years).
-Allow completely open entry into transborder operations (subject to U.S. requirements).
-Remove all restrictions on service immediately and prohibit all
informal understandings regarding entry or service levels, etc.
-Allow abandonment of any service within eight months.
-Allow all airlines to establish such fares as they see fit; increases
in an existing fare above the annual rate of inflation must be approved
by the CTC.
-Greatly liberalize domestic and international charter
regulations.
-Ensure that government owned carriers are not favored or restricted by government or regulatory policy.
5. Telecommunications
-Encourage entry and the provision of specialized private-line
and data communications services; at the same time, prevent refusal to
11 ECON. COUNCIL OF CANADA, REFORMING REGULATION

Supply and Service Canada, Ottawa).

(1981) (available from Minister of
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supply or discriminatory pricing and require interconnection as in the
CNPC case.
-Remove all restrictions on the leasing and resale of long-haul
transmission facilities including satellites.
-Permit all forms of attachment unless the devices can be shown
to result in technical harm to the telephone system.
If they were implemented, these recommendations would bring Canadian practice largely into line with that of the United States. In two
other areas, implementation of the ECC's proposals would actually increase the contestability of Canadian markets vis-a-vis those in the United
States:
Agricultural Marketing Boards
-Make output quotas divisible and freely transferable among individual producers; make all future output quotas and a significant
proportion of existing quotas freely transferable within Canada; relax
other restrictions on quotas that impair efficiency.
-Re-examine the objectives, terms and structure of the industrial
milk subsidy program; make the Milk Supply Management Committee
and the Canadian Diary Commission subject to the supervision of the
National Farm Products Marketing council.
7. Tidal Fisheries
-Regulate individual ocean fisheries through a system of transferable, quantitative, stinted landing rights based on optimal sustainable yields.
-Review the federal and provincial direct subsidies in the form of
grants or low-interest loans on gear or various tax incentives, with a
view to phasing them out gradually.
6.

Under bilateral free-trade, adoption of such policies in Canada could
stimulate consideration of similarly enlightened practices in the United
States. It would then be a simple matter to rationalize orderly marketing
regimes between the two countries by making existing quotas for like
products freely transferable in North America. 12
The areas of banking, insurance, financial services and broadcasting
will be more difficult to deal with. However, the more overtly discriminatory aspects of regulation in these areas could be largely eliminated if
both countries were to extend national treatment to the other's firms. In
addition, both the United States and Canada seriously over regulate the
delivery of professional services, particularly at the provincial and state
levels. This is done primarily via restrictions on the mobility of professionals and technicians: attorneys, doctors, other health care professionals, accountants, dog groomers, etc. and also through restrictions on
12

See ECON.

COUNCIL OF CANADA, NEWFOUNDLAND: FROM DEPENDENCY TO SELF-RELI-

(1980) (available from Minister of Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa); PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL FISHERIES IN CANADA (Scott and Neher eds. 1981); Scott, Regulation and
the Location of JurisdictionalPowers: The Fishery, 20 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 780 (1982).
ANCE
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practice. However, even under comprehensive free-trade, both countries
would most likely continue to follow these practices.
The case of social regulation is more difficult-one can't just say
"deregulate here." But the Economic Council's recommendations point
to a solution, particularly those which relate to the assignment of transferable property rights to fishery and agricultural quota holders. When
the rights conferred by regulation are fully transferable, they can and
usually will be acquired by those who will employ them most productively. The property rights assignment approach, 3 therefore, satisfies
two of the requirements of the transition to efficient and fair contestable
markets: a definitive specification of property rights and compensation to
correct maldistributive consequences that result from greater reliance on
private actions. The third requirement is the elaboration of institutional
ranges that would allow interested parties to seek and obtain local remedies. Fortunately, this requirement is generally satisfied in our two countries by the existence of a similar body of common law governing
property contracts and torts.
The Canadian economist Dales has explained that we can eliminate
most of the impediments to dynamic efficiency (and, by implication, to
foreign competition created by regulatory practice in these areas) by
making the favored status of the status quo interests fully transferable.
One example of this would be transforming the discharge permits issued
under the Clean Air Act or the Clean Water Act into transferable property rights. I would suggest that the implementation of this insight
should also be high on the policy agenda of bilateral free traders, as
should the elaboration of uniform product standards.
III.

THE GOVERNMENT SECTOR

In this sector, also, free-traders concentrate on the tip of the iceberg:
the various "Buy American" and "Buy Canadian" ordinances promulgated by federal and local jurisdictions. These are certainly serious restraints for the contestability of markets, but they're not the only ones.
This perspective, for example, ignores all of those goods and services that
government performs for itself. Many of these could be provided via
contestable markets. I am not going to discuss what is termed "privatization" in any detail, but will remind you that the choice of public or
private finance is entirely-at least in theory-separate from the choice
of public or private supply.
There is evidence to show a wide variety of services that are frequently supplied by public monopoly can be performed as satisfactorily,
13 See generally Coase, The Nature ofthe Firm, reprintedin READINGS IN PRICE THEORY 331
(Am. Econ. Assoc. 1952); Dales, Land, Water, and Ownership, 1 CAN. J. ECON. 791 (1968); DALES,
POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES (1968); Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs, 5 J. ECON. THEORY 395 (1972); Scott, Fisheries,Pollution and CanadianAmerican TransnationalRelations, 28 INT'L ORGANIZATION 847 (1974).
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and in some cases more satisfactorily, by competing organizations. Examples of these are (in alphabetical order): air traffic control,14 custodial
services and building maintenance,1 5 day care centers,16 electrical power
generation, 1 7 fire protection services,1 8 forest management,1 9 management of grazing lands,2" hospitals and health care services,2 1 housing,22
postal services,2 3 prisons and correctional facilities, 4 property assessment, 25 refuse collection,2 6 security services, 27 ship and
aircraft mainte31
30
nance, 28 urban mass transit, 29 waste water treatment, water supply,
and weather forecasting. 32 Given contestable markets, some of these
services could undoubtedly be traded.
Even where governments choose to acquire services from non-governmental suppliers, they frequently do so in such a way as to restrict the
contestability and to preclude the possibility of foreign competition.
Without going into substantial detail, let me remind you of what a firm
must do to be judged a responsible bidder by the U.S. Dept. of Defense.
At a minimum, contractors must demonstrate compliance with the
following provisions: the Buy American Act; the Preference for U.S.
Food, Clothing & Fibers Act; the Preference for Steel Plate Act; the
Clean Air Act of 1970; the Equal Employment Act; the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938; the Release of Product Information to Consumers
Act; the Prohibition of Price Differentials Requirement; the Required
Source for Jeweled Bearing Standard; the Prison Made Supplies Act; the
14 Poole, Air Traffic Control. the PrivateSector, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDS 216 (Oct.
1982).
15 Bennett & DiLorenzo, Public Employee Unions and the Prvatizationof "PublicServices" 4 J.
LABOR RESEARCH 43; See also Blankart, BureaucraticProblems in Public Choice: Why Do Public
Goods Still Remain Public?,in PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC FINANCE 155-67 (Roskamp ed. 1979).

16 See Bennett & DiLorenzo, supra note 15.
17 Id

18 Poole, Fighting Firesfor Profit, REASON (May 1976); Smith Feet to the Fire, REASON 23
(May 1983).
19 Hanke, The PrivatizationDebate, CATO J. 656 (1982).
20 Hanke, Land Policy, in AGENDA '83 65 (Howill ed. 1983).
21 Hanke, Privatization:Theory, Evidence, Implementation, in CONTROL OF FEDERAL SPENDING 106 (Harriss ed. 1985).
22 WEICKER, HOUSING 80 (1980).

23 Hanke, supra note 21, at 108.
24 Id at 108-09.
25 POOLE, CUTING BACK CITY HALL 164 (1980).
26 Savas, Policy Analysisfor Local Government, 3 POL'Y ANALYSIS 49 (1977); Bennett & John-

son, Public vs. Private Provision of Collective Goods and Services, 34 PUB. CHOICE 55 (1979).
27 See Hanke, supra note 21, at 109-10.
28 BENNETr & JOHNSON, BETTER GOVERNMENT AT HALF THE PRICE: PRIVATE PRODUCTION OF PUBLIC SERVICES 52 (1980); Bennett & DiLorenzo, supra note 15, at 43.

29 Hanke, supra note 21, at 110.
30 Id.

31 Crain & Zardkoohi, A Test of the Property-Rights Theory of the Firm: Water Utilities in the
United States, 21 J. L. & ECON. 395 (1978).
32 Bennett & DiLorenzo, supra note 15, at 39.
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Required Source of Aluminum Ingot Act; the Small Business Act; the
Labor Surplus Area Concerns Act; the National Women's Business Enterprise Policy Act; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; the
Convict Labor Act; the Davis-Bacon Act; the Renegotiation Act; the
Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act; and many others.
Furthermore, there are government regulations governing accounting practices, the use of government-furnished property, the handling of
labor disputes, insurance requirements, patents, proprietary data and so
on and so forth.3 3 It's hardly surprising that Ernest Fitzgerald likened
competition in these markets to "a track meet with participation limited
to middle-aged ladies each weighing in excess of 300 pounds."3 4 Nor is it
surprising that the military procurement system doubles the cost of acquiring some very important defense systems-primarily ships.

IV. THE POTENTIAL SECTOR
If my comments regarding the relevance of promoting contestable
markets in the public sector to free bilateral trade seem unrealistic, my
comments regarding this sector may seem even more so-though I hope
not, because this is in fact a sector that ought to be considered. What we
lack here is an appropriate framework regulation which would permit
trade in each country. The absence of that framework regulation makes
bilateral trade impossible.
I will concentrate here on trade in clean air, but the ideas presented
apply to other possible areas of trade as well- agricultural quotas, fish
landing rights and, though a bit unrealistic, money-creation rights. The
most obvious example is water. Unambiguously, water is of potentially
great importance to bilateral U.S.-Canada trade. In the absence, however, of an unambiguous assignment of property rights to the use of this
resource, it's hard to see how this potential could be realized. I would
stress that both Canada and the United States lack clearly specified property rights to water.
Let's consider the possibility with respect to trade in clean air and
the case of acid rain. We all know that acid rain is a serious problemone that calls for a serious solution. But what most people propose to do
about it, in both the United States and Canada, is more of the same kind
of regulation achieved under the Clean Air Act and its subsequent
amendments: uniform standards, technical fixes, and a complete disregard for costs.
There is simply no logic to a mitigation strategy based upon uniform
reductions in emissions. (The requirement that this be accomplished by
scrubbers, as recently proposed in legislation introduced in Congress,
would merely increase the cost of an ineffective approach.) Uniform re33 Thompson, Managing Defense Expenditures, inCONTROL OF FEDERAL SPENDING 72 (Harriss ed. 1985).
34 FITZGERALD, THE HIGH PRIESTS OF WASTE 4 (1972).
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ductions in emissions are illogical because the damage done by emissions
of oxides of sulphur are a function of: a) the location of the source, b) the
patterns of emission and prevailing weather, and c) characteristics of the
deposition site.
Ohio is a good example. Ohio, produces less than 10% of SO2 emitted in the United States. Unfortunately, because of its location, its reliance on tall stacks, and the sensitivity of downwind ecosystems in the
northeastern United States and Canada, it is probably responsible for as
much as 30% of the damage done by the long-range deposition of oxides
of sulphur in this hemisphere. Clearly, a coal-fired power plant located
in Toledo, Ohio, will do far more damage than an identical plant located
on the ocean side of Long Island that deposits its emission harmlessly
into the ocean.
An efficient damage mitigation strategy would, therefore, be site specific and would rely on a range of tactics: the use of low-sulphur coal,
refinery modifications to remove sulphur from oil, relocation of plants in
some cases, local deposition where that would not be terribly harmful,
lake liming and even scrubbers in some cases. It becomes apparent that
it's not fair to ask the SO 2 exporters to bear the full burden of damage
mitigation. To a considerable degree long-range acid deposition, in the
United States at least, is a problem created by Federal environmental and
energy policy. Furthermore, most existing point sources in the United
States operate under permits granted under state implementation plans
approved by the Environmental Protection Agency.
On the other hand, it's even more obvious that it's not fair to expect
SO2 importers to bear either the damages or the full cost of mitigating
the damages from acid deposition. What I would suggest is that a proper
response to this program would take the form of a grant program directed to importing states and provinces. The importing states and provinces (which, in this case, are "importing" SO2) could take these monies
to mitigate damages. That is, they could use the money to a) convince
upwind polluters on either side of the Canada-U.S. border to abate their
emissions; b) reduce emissions locally; or c) reduce damages locally.
The EPA, together with its Canadian counterpart, could provide advice; monitor and facilitate interstate and interprovincial trading efforts;
and perhaps enforce the transfer of permits. With decisions about how,
where, or how much to mitigate acid deposition, damages would be in
the hands of those with the greatest incentive to do something about the
problem for the people who suffer from it. Support for such a grant program could be shared, in some proportion, between the Federal governments of Canada and the United States.
Note that this solution satisfies the three requirements alluded to
above. One difference is that local remedies would be sought through
local collective action rather than privately. However, the system of private contracts and tort liability is obviously of limited relevance to the
problem of obtaining relief from damages caused by acid deposition. I
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can't imagine either Congress or Parliament coming up with any answer
to the private damage issue except to deny private action. Instead my
proposal would permit emissions importing states and provinces, individually or severally, to enforce contracts with point sources and state regulatory officials in exporting states and provinces through the courts. I
would hope that the trade creation benefits of this proposal would be
obvious, as well as those that would accrue as a result of more efficient
markets and more importantly, dynamic economic adjustment.
V.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In my comments I have tried to stress the gains from trade in general, and dynamic economic adjustment in particular. I have implied the
desirability of speeding up the process of economic change and, therefore, growth. But there is another side to this argument. Economic adjustment is neither painless nor costless.
The complement of growth is destruction. Under competition, organizations fail and managers are fired. Jobs are lost, labor leaders lose
their constituents, stockholders lose the value of their stock in the organization, plants close and property holders in affected communities suffer
capital losses. Furthermore, while it is undoubtedly true that the way to
minimize the total costs of transition to a more competitive regime is to
move to it as quickly and comprehensively as possible, this strategy has
the effect of concentrating the incidence of the costs of transition on a
small minority of the total population. Because losses are not evenly
spread throughout the population, they are both visible and dramatic.
Economists tend to view most of these losses with equanimity. They
understand that managers are mobile, that asset holders can diversify
their portfolios and stand to gain more from growth than they do from
the destruction that comes with it. Furthermore, economists generally
fail to see an equity argument for protecting people who are better off
than average from the vicissitudes of the market. They may even overlook the degree to which the politically influential-people with property, rentiers and quasi-rentiers, and to a lesser extent labor leaders-can
disguise self-interest as altruistic concern for the plight of workers who
are thrown out of work by economic change, thereby obtaining far
broader support for protectionist policies than would otherwise be
imaginable.
One unambiguous lesson of our experience with deregulation in the
United States is that, if we are to promote freer trade and the capital
shifts that go with it, we must find a way to mitigate its adverse consequences for those who are least capable of bearing them-primarily
workers-or these consequences will give rise to new protectionist pressures. The more visible and dramatic these consequences are, the harder
these pressures will be to resist.
In particular it will not suffice merely to observe that when the econ-
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omy is adapting to economic change, jobs are not really lost to workers
who, given a car and a full gas tank, can move on to other jobs in expanding organizations, industries or sectors. Nor is it sufficient to point
out that the new jobs will likely be more productive and perhaps even
better paid. The simple fact is that existing jobs are eliminated by economic change and that movement can be very painful. As William Branson has observed, a policy of encouraging open trade and resource
reallocation will not stand by itself, what we need is:
a program that provides retraining and relocation assistance for workers who have to adjust....Designing an effective program of this kind
should be a high priority for policy makers and researchers today, for
it is an essential part of a policy package to keep the economy flexible
and competitive.
I should note in closing that the best way to spread the costs of the
transition to a more competitive regime is not to delay the transition, but
to use general tax revenues of the federal governments of our two countries to mitigate the costs to those most severely hurt by adjustment, at
least to those least capable of bearing them. We can ill afford to do
otherwise.
The problem is that, in a number of cases, we don't know how to use
general tax revenues to mitigate these costs efficiently or fairly. The
property rights assignment approach may not work in every case and
direct income transfers leave much to be desired. Perhaps there are steps
that could be taken jointly that would serve this end, such as permitting
those who lose their jobs as a result of trade adjustments to move freely
throughout North America. Such steps should be carefully investigated
by those of us who favor freer bilateral trade.

